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Abstract
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wage subsidy programme offers merely a temporary respite from unemployment, or whether
there are longer-lasting positive employability effects. Controlling for selection bias using a
bivariate probit analysis, we estimate the effect of participation in the Special Youth
Employment Training Program on the probability of being employed in subsequent waves of
the data, up to an average of 26 months after subsidy expiry. We find that far from breaking
up when support expires, subsidies extend short duration jobs. Furthermore, we find large and
significant effects of participation on the subsequent employability. Much of this arises from
retention of subsidised jobs, but even excluding this we find evidence of longer-term positive
effects.
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Do Wage Subsidies Enhance Employability?
Evidence from Australian Youth
James Richardson
1. Introduction
Most of the existing empirical literature on the effects of wage subsidies has focused on
short-term effects – whether eligibility for subsidies increases the individual’s probability of
getting a job, and, if so, to what extent this is at the expense of other job-seekers. However, it
is increasingly being argued, in both policy and academic circles, that the main effect of wage
subsidies is to enhance the longer-term prospects of participants. The claim is that subsidised
workers will not merely enjoy a brief period of employment, but a permanent increase in their
employability. Layard, for example, states that ‘the main justification for [a wage subsidy] is
not that it employs people on a subsidised basis, but that, by doing so, it restores them to the
universe of employable people. This is an investment in human capital.’ (1997, p. 336).
This claim is almost completely untested. Few studies have tracked participants even
until subsidy expiry, and those that have have often suffered from selection bias: those who
go on the programme are not a random sample of the eligible population. Any difference in
outcomes between participants and non-participants may simply reflect pre-existing, but
unobserved, differences between the two groups.
We use a sample of unemployed Australian youth to examine the impact of
participation in a subsidy programme, the Special Youth Employment Training Program
(SYETP), for slightly over two years after subsidy expiry. By using bivariate probit analysis,
we are able to control for selection bias. We find evidence of large and significant positive
impacts on the probability of being employed in subsequent years. Much of this effect seems
to stem from retention of jobs after subsidy expiry, contradicting the concern that firms will
simply lay off participants as soon as the subsidy finishes. We find very little evidence of
such lay offs. Instead subsidies appear to extend the duration of jobs that would otherwise
have lasted for less time than the subsidy. We also find some evidence that participation helps
workers to obtain other jobs, not merely to retain their initially subsidised positions.
The rest of this paper is set out as follows. Section 2 briefly reviews the existing
evidence on the long-term effects of wage subsidies. Section 3 looks at the SYETP and the
potential sources of selection bias. Section 4 discusses the data. Section 5 sets out the
methodology that we adopt to estimate the employability effects of wage subsidy
participation. Results are presented in Section 6 whilst Section 7 concludes.
2. Long-term Effects of Wage Subsidies
Long-term unemployed workers may lose skills, become demotivated, or suffer
discrimination from potential employers. This will reduce their chances of getting a job, and
hence the outflow rate of the long-term unemployed, but it may also lead to an increase in
overall unemployment. If the economy is hit by a shock and long-term unemployment rises,
then, on average, unemployed workers become less attractive to employers. Firms then find it
harder to find suitable workers, increasing the cost of hiring and leading them to offer fewer
vacancies. This, in turn, can perpetuate the high long-term unemployment and consequent
loss of skills or motivation, locking in the higher rate of unemployment (Pissarides, 1992).
At the same time, workers with poor or outdated skills are disproportionately likely to
become long-term unemployed. If unemployed workers are credit-constrained they may find
it hard to update their skills, whilst at the same time they are denied the opportunity of
learning on the job. Higher mismatch between the skills demanded by employers and those
available in the pool of unemployed workers will also lead to higher aggregate
unemployment.
But if skill atrophy or other negative employability effects arise from a period of
unemployment, then they may be reversed by a period of employment. Hence even a
temporary subsidy may have permanent effects, both for the individual worker, who may be
retained or who will find it easier to obtain a subsequent job, and potentially for the aggregate
unemployment level. If active labour market policies lead firms to hire and train workers with
poor skills, then mismatch may be reduced, shifting the Beveridge curve inwards and
reducing aggregate unemployment (Calmfors, 1994).
These effects are potentially far more important than the short-term impact on labour
demand. Subsidies could bring about a considerably larger reduction in unemployment than
that measured simply by taking the number of people placed and netting off those who would
have been hired anyway (deadweight) or who were hired at the expense of other workers
(substitution and displacement). Furthermore, the fiscal cost-benefit analysis would be
transformed if subsidised workers were not merely removed from unemployment for a
temporary spell, but were less likely to claim unemployment benefits in future years. If
positive effects were long-lasting, and especially if they were permanent, then the case for
concentrating on younger workers, as in the UK’s New Deal, would be stronger, since their
lifetime gains would be greater.
However, little is known about the subsequent employment histories of those who go
on wage subsidy programmes. This is despite the existence of a substantial literature tracking
participants in training and job search assistance programmes (see for example, Lalonde,
1995; US Department of Labor, 1995; Friedlander and Burtless, 1995). Furthermore, where
these studies have increasingly made use of either random assignment or statistical methods
to control for selection bias, the same is not true for studies of wage subsidy participants.
Most studies of wage subsidies have surveyed employers currently using the subsidy,
and therefore provide little or no evidence on post-subsidy experience. Breen and Halpin
(1989) re-surveyed a sample of employers who had hired workers under the Irish
government’s Employment Incentive Scheme (EIS), an average of 8 months after subsidy
expiry. They found that 54% of EIS employees remained with the firm, whilst in a further
11% of cases the job, but not the specific worker, remained. However, they provide no
counterfactual to compare these figures against. RSGB (1996) surveyed participants in the
UK Workstart pilot projects, which provided a 12 month subsidy to firms hiring workers who
had been unemployed for at least 2 years. They found that 40% were still with their
Workstart employer 3 months after the subsidy expired, and a further 15% were employed
elsewhere. Only 35% had returned to claiming unemployment benefit (a further 4% were
unemployed but not claiming). Again no counterfactual is provided but the findings do
compare favourably with the 51.8% of all unemployed workers exiting to employment who
re-claim unemployment benefit within 12 months (Sweeney, 1996).
Stretton (1984) compares employment outcomes six months after the end of the
programme for participants in five Australian active labour market programmes, including
the SYETP. Hence the counterfactual is the outcome for participants in other programmes,
rather than those who received no intervention. He finds that those who took part in wage
subsidy programmes were significantly more likely to have been employed at the time of the
survey, or to have had any full-time job since the end of the programme, than those who went
on a training programme. However, this finding is likely to be heavily affected by selection
bias. Wage subsidies require the involvement of employers, who are likely to seek to cream
off the best available candidates, whereas training programmes can be expanded
administratively, and may be used for those for whom a subsidised job could not be found. In
this case, Stretton’s results may reflect more on the different make-up of the participants than
on the relative effectiveness of the programmes1.
A more recent Australian evaluation, DEETYA (1997), uses administrative data on all
participants in Jobstart, which replaced the SYETP. These were then compared against a
matched control group. Three months after the subsidy expired, 50% of Jobstart participants
were in unsubsidised work, compared with 22% of non-participants, suggesting a substantial
impact of participation on short-term employment prospects. After 12 months the effect was
smaller, mainly due to ‘catch-up’ by the controls, but still positive. However, the use of such
matched control groups may give seriously misleading results if there are important
unobserved characteristics of the treatment group which are not controlled for in matching. If,
for example, more motivated workers were more likely to take advantage of wage subsidies,
and to be hired once eligible, then the programme effect would be over-estimated.
Alternatively, if employment service staff sought to target programmes on more
disadvantaged workers, then the estimated effect would understate the true impact.
The overall picture presented by these few studies is positive. The studies do suggest
that an excessive concern with churning – that employers will simply lay off workers when
subsidies expire – is misplaced. Retention rates are generally high. RSGB (1996) found that
among Workstart participants who survived until subsidy expiry, 77% were still with their
employer three months later. Where workers are laid off it appears to occur before subsidy
expiry, presumably due to poor matches. Up to a year after subsidy expiry, programme
participants appear to enjoy an advantage in their employment prospects. But all these studies
are open to considerable criticism. In particular, they are all prone to potentially severe
problems of selection bias. In addition, they only look at a relatively short post-subsidy
period.
Two studies of US programmes avoid both these problems. They use random
assignment to avoid the problem of selection bias, and by making use of administrative data
are able to track participants over a much longer time period than either previous studies or,
indeed, this study. However, the programmes they examine involved substantial elements of
training and support in addition to subsidies, so that it is impossible to separate out the effect
of subsidised employment alone. The use of administrative records also restricts their focus to
earnings, rather than employment, which is our principal concern here. Both studies,
however, reinforce the generally positive findings previously covered.
The National Supported Work Demonstration (Hollister et al, 1984) provided a highly
structured environment over 12-18 months of subsidised employment. For women on Aid to
Families with Dependent Children (AFDC, the main benefit for single parents in the US),
earnings gains were sustained for at least 8 years after participation (Couch, 1992). However,
there were no positive effects for other target groups. A similar, but less intensive, approach
was adopted in the Homemaker-Home Health Aide Demonstrations (Bell and Orr, 1994).
These provided specific training and support to lone mothers on AFDC, as well as subsidised
employment, and again led to significant increases in earnings, for at least 5 years after the
programme (US Department of Labor, 1995).
                                                
1 In an earlier version of this paper (Stretton, 1982), Stretton notes the availability of techniques to correct for
sample selection, but states that their use was ruled out through lack of time.
3. The Special Youth Employment Training Program
The Special Youth Employment Training Program was introduced in September 1976,
following a rapid rise in teenage unemployment in the mid-1970s. This, together with the
earlier failure of a large scale direct job creation programme (the Regional Employment
Development Scheme, REDS), led the government to introduce what was Australia’s first
wage subsidy (Chapman, 1985). The SYETP continued until it was superseded in December
1985 by Jobstart, a wage subsidy for both youth and adults, which has continued until the
present.
The SYETP was initially targeted at teenagers, unemployed for four months or more.
Subsequently it was extended to cover 15-24 year olds. There was no requirement that jobs
be ‘additional’, nor that the firm retain the worker after the subsidy period (Stretton and
Chapman, 1990). Despite the scheme’s name, there was little emphasis on training (Scherer,
1985).
Subsidies were paid at a flat rate, so that they were proportionately greater for low
wage workers. In 1984, the main part of the scheme (‘Standard SYETP’) offered employers a
subsidy of A$75 per week for 17 weeks, about half of average teenage wages (Smith, 1984).
Standard SYETP was targeted on 15-24 year olds who had been unemployed and not in full-
time education for at least 4 of the preceding 12 months. There were two other smaller
components. Commonwealth SYETP fully reimbursed agencies of the Commonwealth
government for the costs of employing eligible participants for 17 weeks. Extended SYETP
offered a subsidy of A$100 for 17 weeks, and A$75 for a further 17 weeks to employers
taking on 18-24 year olds who had been unemployed for at least 8 of the preceding 12
months. In practice, however, participants in both Standard and Extended SYETP often had
much longer durations than those required for eligibility (Smith, 1985).
In order to obtain the subsidy, employers had to register their vacancies with the
Commonwealth Employment Service (CES), and accept workers referred by the CES
(Department of Employment and Youth Affairs, 1982). Employers had to agree a ‘training
plan’ with the CES for the individual worker, although in practice such plans could simply
cover normal orientation (Smith, 1983). In 1979 the government issued guidelines that
employers were expected to take people below their normal hiring standards in order to
qualify (Chapman, 1985), although these were withdrawn in 1982.
Selection
Selection onto the SYETP required both referral by the Employment Service and acceptance
by the employer. Either, or both, of these could have led to systematic, but unobserved,
differences between those who went on the programme and those who did not. Failure to
control for these differences would lead to biased estimates of the programme effect. For
example, if employers creamed the best workers, then selection biases would lead to an
overestimate of the effectiveness of SYETP. Conversely, if the Employment Service referred
more disadvantaged workers, as they were required to between 1979 and 1982, then this
would lead to a downward bias, and an underestimate of the programme effect.
In addition, individuals who were more likely to get employment anyway may have
acted in such a way as to increase or decrease their chances of being referred. For example, if
participation on SYETP was seen as advantageous, then more motivated, or better informed,
individuals might have lobbied CES staff to refer them. Alternatively, if subsidised
employment was seen as ‘second best’ then more employable people might have tried to
avoid being referred, knowing that their chances of obtaining a regular job were high anyway.
A priori we cannot say which way these biases will work. However, assuming that
participants were randomly drawn is unlikely to be satisfactory. Instead we need to control
for the process by which unemployed youth, who were in the SYETP target group, were
selected onto the programme. This can be done by estimating bivariate probits of the joint
probability that an individual was both selected onto SYETP, and subsequently employed.
We set out this methodology in Section 5 below. First we consider the data that we use.
4. The Data
Our sample is drawn from the list sample of the Australian Longitudinal Survey (ALS). The
ALS list sample is a nationally representative sample of Australian youth, aged 15-24 on 1
September 1984, who had been registered as unemployed with the Commonwealth
Employment Service for at least 3 months in June 1984 (McRae et al, 1984–1987). Thus, the
sample frame coincides almost exactly with the eligibility criteria for the SYETP. The sample
were initially interviewed in September or October of 1984, and then re-interviewed annually
until 1987, so that 4 waves of data are available. The ALS list sample was specifically
designed to examine questions around long-term unemployment, and contains a wide range
of individual and family background characteristics.
In each wave, respondents were asked to fill in a weekly job calendar for the period
starting a week after the previous interview and finishing in the week of the current interview
(the ‘reference period’). The 1984 reference period started on 1 January 1984, or the week in
which they entered the labour force if later. Subsequent reference periods typically started in
September or October and ran until the following September or October.
The initial sample consisted of 2403 individuals. Of these, we excluded those who
were over 25 at the first interview (ineligible for SYETP), who entered full-time education at
any point, or who did not provide a full set of responses for at least the first three waves. This
left us with 1283 individuals whose employment status in the 1986 reference period could be
established (the ‘1986 sample’). Table 1 gives some summary statistics for the 1986 sample.
Of these, 1084 survive into the 1987 wave, and make up the ‘1987 sample’. Table 2 contains
summary data for them.
The treatment group consists of all those who went on the SYETP between 3 June
1984 and their 1985 interview. Although this means that there were quite considerable
differences in the elapsed time since programme participation between treatment group
members, we had to use such a long period to obtain a large enough treatment group. Figure
1 shows the distribution of programme start times for treatment group members. Roughly half
entered the programme in 1984 and half in 1985, with the mean start week beginning 13
January 1985.
The overall picture given by Tables 1 and 2 is unsurprising for a sample of
unemployed youths. There were more males than females. Levels of human capital were
relatively low, with over 10% having less than year 10, the school leaving age. More than
half had never held a job for more than 1 year, and they spent an average of over 60% of the
period from 1 January 1984 (or when they first entered the labour force if later) until 3 June
1984 in unemployment.
The characteristics of those lost through attrition are broadly similar to those of the
sample. In particular the characteristics of the 1986 and 1987 samples are virtually identical.
Those who are dropped from both samples were somewhat more likely to have less than year
10 education, but were more likely to have held a job for at least 1 year, and less likely never
to have had a job. Overall, it seems reasonable to treat attrition biases as a minor problem.
More striking is the contrast between those who went on SYETP and the control
group. On average, SYETP participants were less likely to have any post-school qualification
(17.3% versus 27.9%) and correspondingly more likely to have year 11 or 12 as their highest
qualification. In addition they were less likely to have had any job for 3 years or more, but
more likely to have had a job of less than 1 year as their longest. SYETP participants were an
average of one year younger, which may partly explain their poorer labour market
experience. They spent slightly more of the pre-June period unemployed.
The summary statistics suggest that SYETP participants were younger and more
disadvantaged than non-participants, which would be in line with the apparent targeting of
the programme. The most disadvantaged, though, those with below year 10 education or who
had never held a job, do not appear to be over-represented on the programme, perhaps
because employers were unwilling to hire them even with a subsidy. Yet despite their
generally poorer characteristics, SYETP participants were nearly 14 percentage points more
likely to have been employed at some time in 1986 than non-participants. By 1987, with the
economy growing, this difference had fallen to around 5 percentage points, but was still
positive.
These findings are reinforced if we examine the durations of SYETP jobs compared
with those of other jobs. Figure 2 shows the distribution of lengths of all regular jobs held
after 3 June 19842, whilst Figure 3 shows the distribution of subsidised jobs. Since this
includes all subsidised jobs in the four waves, some may have been obtained through Jobstart
as well as through the SYETP. At this time Jobstart was available for 26 weeks. Two features
are notable in these diagrams. Firstly, there is little or no evidence in Figure 3 of a peak in job
durations at the length of the subsidy. There is a slight peak at 17 weeks (though none at 26
weeks), but certainly no evidence of widespread lay offs on subsidy expiry.
More noticeable though is the difference in the distributions between Figures 2 and 3.
SYETP jobs are clearly less likely to be very short, with markedly lower densities below 13
weeks, and correspondingly higher densities between 13 and 33 weeks. The average length of
SYETP jobs is 46.0 weeks, compared to 37.1 weeks for regular jobs. However, the averages
for SYETP and regular jobs that last more than 13 weeks are 58.8 and 58.5 weeks
respectively. From the raw data, the effect of SYETP appears to be to extend very short
duration jobs somewhat, perhaps up to the duration of the subsidy.
However, these plots will be affected by a number of biases. Any one person can have
more short duration jobs over some given period than long duration jobs. Hence short
duration jobs are ‘over-represented’. The same effect could apply to SYETP jobs, since a
short SYETP spell would not affect the individual’s entitlement to go on the programme
again. But it seems unlikely that the CES would continuously place the same individual into a
series of short duration SYETP jobs, and we observe very few people going on SYETP more
than once in any wave of the data.
Since we only have data until the 1987 interview, any jobs still held then will be right
censored. Aggregate unemployment was falling over this period, so that we would expect a
larger proportion of unsubsidised jobs to start towards the end of the period, whilst more of
the subsidised jobs start towards the beginning of the period, when unemployment was
higher. In Figure 4, we plot the distribution of all jobs that started immediately after a period
of unemployment. This will compensate somewhat for right censoring bias, and also for the
possibility that entry jobs are less stable, or less desirable, than subsequent jobs. The
comparison with SYETP positions is even more marked here. Fully 40% of entry jobs last for
less than 13 weeks, whereas fewer than 25% of SYETP jobs end by then. Again the effect of
                                                
2  To minimise problems from right censoring, figures 2–8 are plotted for the 1987 sample.
SYETP appears to be in extending otherwise very short duration jobs, rather than on the
distribution at higher durations.
Figures 2–4 take no account of differences between participants and non-participants.
We can control for this by looking at before-and-after experiences of SYETP participants.
Figures 5 and 6 show the length of unemployment spells before going on SYETP and after
participation, again including any subsidy participation in the sample period after 3 June
1984, and not just those counted as the treatment group. Figures 7 and 8 show the equivalent
for employment spells (ie periods of continuous employment, which might include job-to-job
switches). The pattern is clear: periods of unemployment are shorter, and periods of
employment are longer, after going on SYETP.
Of course, we still have the problems of censoring and exogenous changes in the
economic climate. Pre-SYETP periods are inevitably earlier, on average, than post-SYETP
periods, so that figures 5–8 may simply reflect improvements in the macroeconomy. At the
same time, most SYETP spells are earlier in the period, so that left censoring will tend to
shorten pre-SYETP spells (spells starting before 3 June 1984 are excluded). This undermines
the apparent increase in duration of post-SYETP employment spells, but strengthens the
finding that post-SYETP unemployment spells are shorter. Right censoring leads to the
opposite bias: post-SYETP spells will be shortened by right censoring, strengthening the
apparent effect on the duration of employment spells post-SYETP, but weakening the
findings for unemployment spells.
The overall picture from the data is highly supportive of a positive employability
effect from SYETP. Subsidised jobs last longer than unsubsidised jobs, mainly because of a
substantially lower probability of jobs terminating within the first quarter. There is at most
weak evidence of a concentration of lay offs at the time of subsidy expiry, with two-thirds of
participants retaining their subsidised job beyond 17 weeks3. Furthermore, unemployment
spells are shorter, and employment spells are longer, after participating. Nonetheless, these
findings may be affected by biases arising from differences between participants and non-
participants, censoring, or changes in the economic environment.
5. Modelling Employability
We want to determine what happens to subsidised workers beyond the subsidy period. In
particular, do they obtain a lasting improvement in their employability? We can control for
biases arising from changes in the economy, and from censoring, by considering individual
outcomes over the same time period. We can control for individual differences by including a
wide range of background data available to us in the ALS. In addition, we can control for
selection biases by using a bivariate probit, giving us an unbiased estimate of the effect of
SYETP participation on subsequent employability.
Employability, of course, is not observed. What we observe instead is employment.
Nor is there a precise definition of ‘employability’, despite the growing use of the term. We
do not propose to enter the debate as to what exactly is meant by employability. Instead, we
shall assume that there is a simple mapping between an individual’s underlying, but
unobserved, employability and the employment outcome which we observe. We assume that
employability is a latent variable, y *, such that:
                                                
3  The effect is slightly stronger, if we exclude those jobs which might have come under the longer Jobstart
subsidy, with 69.1% exceeding 17 weeks duration against 65.5% for all subsidised jobs in the data. Of these,
45.4% last beyond the 34 week maximum subsidy for Extended SYETP.
(1)  y d xi i i i* = + ¢ +a b e
where d i  is a dummy variable taking the value 1 if the person goes on the wage subsidy
programme, and 0 otherwise; x i  is a vector of individual characteristics; and ei  is a
disturbance or error term. We observe employment, y, where y=1 if the person is employed in
some period, and y=0 otherwise. If y y y= > =1 0 0 when  and *  otherwise, then provided ei
is distributed as a standard normal, we can estimate (1) using standard probit estimation.
The selection problem arises because programme participants are not randomly
selected from the population. In particular, suppose that the likelihood of being selected onto
the programme is represented by d *, which is determined by:
(2) d zi i i* = ¢ +g n such that: d d di i i= > =1 0 0 if  and  otherwise* .
where z i  is a vector of individual characteristics and ni  is an error term. Provided ni  is
distributed as a standard normal, we could again estimate (2) by a univariate probit. However,
if there are unobserved characteristics which affect both selection onto the programme and
subsequent employability then ei  and ni  will be correlated and univariate probit estimates
will be biased.
Using a technique originating with Van de Ven and Van Praag (1981), we can address
this problem by estimating a bivariate probit of the joint probabilities of selection and
employment of the form:
y d xi i i i* = + ¢ +a b e
(3) d zi i i* = ¢ +g n where: E i ien rb g=
Prob( , ) , ,y d d x zi i i i i= = = + ¢ ¢1 1 2F a b g rb g
Where F 2 is the cumulative distribution function for the standard bivariate normal. This is
essentially an extension of the well-known Heckman (1979) two-stage procedure, where the
second stage here also has a discrete dependent variable. This approach has been applied to a
number of economic problems which suffer from selection bias. In particular, O’Higgins
(1994) uses it to examine the effect of participation in the UK Youth Training Scheme on
subsequent employment, whilst Zweimüller and Winter-Ebmer (1996) use it to look at the
effect of Austrian training programmes on employment stability. Both find that selection bias
is important in their studies, with those who would otherwise be less likely to be employed
tending to be selected onto these programmes.
The dependent variables
For the selection equations, the dependent variable is whether the person went onto the
SYETP at any time between 3 June 1984 and the end of the 1985 reference period. For the
1986 sample, the dependent variable for the employment equation is whether the person held
any regular, unsubsidised, job during the 1986 reference period, but excluding the first 17
weeks. Retained jobs that were previously subsidised in 1984/85 are included, but any
subsequent SYETP/Jobstart jobs are excluded. Jobs obtained through other government
programmes are also excluded. We exclude the first 17 weeks after the 1985 interview, since
anyone entering SYETP in the week of their 1985 interview would still be being subsidised
for those 17 weeks. Hence the relevant period starts four months later, at the end of January
1986.
In principle, some of our treatment group might have gone onto Extended SYETP, in
which case they would be subsidised for up to 34 weeks. Unfortunately, we cannot
distinguish between the two types of SYETP in our data. Of the treatment group, 23 people
started their subsidy in the last 17 weeks of the 1985 reference period, and hence might still
have been on Extended SYETP 18 or more weeks into their 1986 reference period. However,
of these, 21 were either ineligible for Extended SYETP or had already lost their subsidised
job before the 17 week cut-off period. Both the remaining people were employed for the
entire 1986 reference period, and hence were clearly employed after subsidies had expired.
Therefore, we believe that we can safely ignore any problems arising from Extended SYETP.
For the 1987 sample, our dependent variable in the employment equation is whether
the person held any unsubsidised job, excluding those obtained through another government
programme, at any time in the 1987 reference period (October 1986 – September 1987).
Again we include any previously subsidised jobs retained from 1984/85, but exclude any
obtained with subsequent subsidies, even if they are retained beyond the subsidy period. Thus
we are looking at the effect on subsequent regular employment, and not simply any
propensity for participants to cycle between government programmes and periods of
unemployment.
On average, for the 1986 sample, we look at employment in the period starting 1 year
after participants entered SYETP (8 months after subsidy expiry), and ending 17 months after
programme entry. The 1987 reference period starts 18 months after entry, and ends 30
months after entry (26 months after expiry).
Identification
Our model is identified provided there is at least one variable in z i  which is not in x i
(Maddala, 1983). Hence, we need at least one variable which affected the probability of
selection, but not the subsequent probability of being employed. Selection onto SYETP
required both that the individual was hired by an employer, and that they were referred by the
employment service. Any variables that affected the employer’s decision are also likely to
have affected subsequent employment prospects, and should be in both the selection and the
employment equations.
To identify the model, therefore, we need a variable that affected the individual’s
probability of being referred by the CES. We only observe SYETP referrals if they lead to
employment, but we do observe how many times an individual was referred, in 1984, to
another programme, the Community Employment Programme (CEP), whether or not they
went on the CEP. If employment service staff pushed the same individuals towards a range of
available programmes, then we would expect this to be correlated with selection onto the
SYETP. Given an element of discretion in the referral decisions of employment service staff,
and that we control in the employment equation for whether the person actually went on the
CEP, it seems reasonable to assume that referrals onto the CEP would not affect subsequent
employment prospects.
This is our principal identifying assumption. However, our model is also identified in
two other ways. Firstly, age is never significant in the employment equation, presumably
because of the narrow age range within our sample, and is dropped. However, SYETP places
were predominantly taken up by teenagers (Stretton and Chapman, 1990), and we find that
age has a negative and strongly significant coefficient in all our selection equations.
Secondly, time varying characteristics, such as human capital and marital status, are 1984
dated in the selection equation, but 1985 or 1986 dated in the employment equations.
Since the model will remain identified, formally at least, if we include CEP referrals
in the employment equation, we can test this identifying assumption. We always find that
CEP referrals are insignificant in the employment equation, but significant in the selection
equation, and so we conclude that excluding CEP referrals from xi and including it in zi is a
valid identifying assumption.
6. Results
Table 3 gives the results of univariate probit estimates of the probabilities of being employed
in 1986 and 1987. We can see that SYETP participation has a positive effect on
employability in both years, although it is only significant in 1986. The magnitudes of the
marginal effects of participation in both years are similar to raw differences in the summary
statistics. Most other coefficients are much as we would expect. Women are less likely to be
employed than men, women with children overwhelmingly so. Marriage has no significant
effect, but having an employed spouse is significantly positive in 1986. Employment
prospects are worse in South Australia and the Northern Territories. More human capital or
past work experience increases the probability of being employed, whilst health problems
reduce it.
Participation in a government employment programme, other than SYETP, between
June 1984 and the 1985 interview has a strongly negative effect on employment. The main
other programmes at the time were the Community Employment Programme and the Wage
Pause Programme, both direct job creation schemes targeted specifically at those with
particular labour market disadvantages (Stretton and Chapman, 1990). Thus this may reflect
these disadvantages rather than any negative effects of the programmes themselves.
Controlling for selection
If selection biases are a significant problem, then the results in Table 3 may be misleading.
We present the bivariate probit results for the employment equation, controlling for selection,
in Table 4. Columns 1 and 2 are the 1986 results, and columns 3 and 4 those for 1987. The
corresponding selection equations are given in Table 5.
The results in Table 4 are coefficients from the bivariate probit. We report marginal
effects below. However, the pattern of signs and significant coefficients is almost identical to
the univariate probits, except that now the effect of SYETP is positive and significant in both
years, falling just below 5% significance in 1987, but easily significant at 10%.
In both cases the correlation coefficient, r, is negative, implying that those most
likely to be selected onto the programme have unobserved characteristics that make it less
likely that they would otherwise be employed. Wald tests on r reject the hypothesis that the
errors are uncorrelated. This shows the importance of allowing for selection biases. Failing to
control for selection would underestimate the impact of SYETP participation on subsequent
employment prospects. In particular, the univariate probits imply an insignificant effect in
1987, whereas the effect is significant when we allow for the selection process. A negative
value of r is consistent with employment service staff targeting programmes on those who
are more disadvantaged.
Marginal effects
Table 6 gives the marginal effects. The first part shows the marginal effect of the SYETP,
averaged across the whole sample and across various sub-samples. For example, the marginal
effect of SYETP for females is the result of calculating the individual marginal effect for
each of the females in the sample, and then averaging4. This method takes account of any
systematic differences in other characteristics between females and males, as well as the
effect of being female per se. The bottom half of the table gives the marginal effects
(averaged across the whole sample) of various other characteristics, which are all fairly
similar to those in the univariate probits.
The effect of SYETP participation on subsequent employability is found to be not
only significant, but also large. After controlling for selection biases, the effects are
substantially greater than those reported in the univariate probits, consistent with our finding
that more disadvantaged workers were selected onto the programme (r negative). Going on
SYETP increases the average probability of having a job at some time between 8 and 13
months after subsidy expiry by 26%. Between 14 and 26 months after subsidy expiry, the
effect is still nearly 20%.
Looking at the various sub-sample effects it is clear that participation in SYETP is
most useful for those with greater disadvantage: females, those with lower human capital or
poorer work records and from more disadvantaged families5 all gain more than the average,
as do those living in South Australia or the Northern Territories. The effect is also stronger
for younger people. By contrast, the effect is roughly halved for those who went to private
school, have an apprenticeship or have had a previous job for 3 or more years.
The pattern of effects across the different sub-samples is very similar in the two years,
with the same groups gaining more or less than the average in every case. The effects are
always smaller in 1987. This fall-off probably reflects a combination of ‘catch-up’ by the
control group, against a background of falling unemployment, and depreciation of the
advantage of participation, especially as retained jobs break up. Although there is no
particular reason to suppose that this fall-off was linear, a simple extrapolation would imply
that SYETP participants had an employability advantage for 4 years after subsidy expiry.
Comparing the marginal effect of SYETP with those for other variables reinforces our
conclusion that programme participation has a very large impact. Only the negative effect for
women with children is larger in magnitude than the average SYETP effect, even in 1987.
Job retention and subsequent employability
Much of the positive effect arising from SYETP participation probably arose from retention
of subsidised jobs after subsidy expiry. This was clearly part of the point of the programme,
to get disadvantaged workers into jobs and support them for long enough that they could
remain profitably employed in those jobs subsequently, without the need for a subsidy.
However, we are also interested in what happened to participants after they left their initially
subsidised job: did they then find it easier to obtain another job than they would otherwise
have done?
Ideally, we would want to measure employment outcomes after all the retained jobs
have terminated, but this is not possible given the data. Hence we have to restrict the sample
in such a way as to exclude those who retained their subsidised jobs throughout the period.
                                                
4  Greene (1997, p. 876) states that current practice favours this approach over the alternative of evaluating at the
sample mean.
5 The pattern of coefficients for mother’s status is similar to that for father’s.
We do this by excluding all people who were continuously employed from the time when
they first got a job, or went on SYETP, until the end of the 1986 reference period. Since we
only consider SYETP participants who entered the programme between June 1984 and the
end of the 1985 reference period, we similarly only exclude people whose jobs started within
that period and were continuously employed until the end of the 1986 reference period.
By restricting the sample in this way, we are excluding the most employable workers.
Implicitly, we are assuming that they would have obtained, and kept, jobs with or without the
subsidy. Amongst those whom we exclude, exactly the same proportion (79%) of those who
went on the SYETP, and those who did not, remain continuously employed until the end of
the 1987 reference period. The proportion of SYETP participants remaining in the restricted
sub-sample is virtually unchanged from the full 1987 sample (7.6% vs 8.0%). In addition, we
saw in section 4 that at long durations the distribution of job tenure was broadly the same for
SYETP and regular jobs. Hence we believe that it is reasonable to assume that restricting the
sample in this way will not introduce any biases.
Table 7 shows the employment equation, from the bivariate probit, for the probability
of being employed at some point in 1987 for the sub-sample of less employable workers. The
dependent variable is now employment in a job that has never been subsidised, nor obtained
through any other government programme. The coefficient on SYETP is positive and
significant, suggesting that participation in the SYETP had a positive employability effect
even for those who lost their initially subsidised job. The correlation coefficient, r, is again
negative and significant, implying that, within the restricted sub-sample as well as the whole
sample, those selected onto the programme were less likely to have been employed
otherwise. The marginal effect of participation, averaged over the sub-sample, of SYETP
participation on the probability of being employed in 1987 is 23.7%. However, this is not
comparable with the whole sample effect, since we saw in Table 6 that the effect of SYETP
participation was highest among those with initially greater disadvantage.
Participation in the SYETP therefore appears to have had a positive employability
effect beyond just the advantage from retaining initially subsidised jobs. Even those who lose
their initially subsidised job are more likely to be employed at some time in 1987 than if they
had never been on the programme. Hence the evidence implies that a period of subsidised
employment can mitigate the damaging effects of unemployment, even for those who return
to unemployment after going on the programme.
7. Conclusion
The impact of wage subsidies on subsequent employability has been much discussed but little
researched. Despite the copious equivalent literature for training programmes, and job search
assistance, we know surprisingly little about what happens to participants in wage subsidies
after the subsidy runs out. Using a panel of Australian youth, we have attempted to answer
two main questions. Firstly, do subsidised jobs break up when the subsidy expires, so that
they only offer a temporary respite from unemployment? And secondly, are there longer-term
benefits for participants, in the form of higher future employability?
We find little evidence that subsidised jobs break up when the subsidy expires.
Instead, subsidies appear to extend the life of very short duration jobs, that would otherwise
have broken up before the subsidy expired. For jobs lasting longer than 13 weeks, subsidised
and unsubsidised jobs have almost identical average durations. This finding is consistent with
subsidies being used to overcome fixed costs of hiring and training, after which subsidised
workers become sufficiently productive that the job is viable even without the subsidy
(Richardson, 1997).
Furthermore, we find a large and significant positive effect on subsequent
employment prospects. Controlling for both a wide range of individual and family
background characteristics, and for selection biases, we estimate that participants in the
Special Youth Employment Training Program were 26% more likely to have a job at some
point between January and September 1986, and 20% more likely to have a job at some point
between October 1986 and September 1987. The effects are larger still for more
disadvantaged and younger workers.
A large part of this effect, particularly in 1986, stems from retention of the initially
subsidised job. Nonetheless, by 1987 there was also a positive and significant effect on the
probability of obtaining a subsequent, never subsidised, job.
These findings suggest that wage subsidies do far more than provide a brief period of
employment. Instead they appear to offer a lasting improvement in employment prospects,
both through retention of initially subsidised jobs, and through improved employability once
the initial job breaks up. However, further research is needed to establish how long these
effects last for, and how quickly they die away. This would make possible a proper cost-
benefit analysis of policies that are all too often evaluated only on their immediate effects.
Data covering a longer period would also allow an investigation of the kinds of jobs
subsequently obtained by participants.
Table 1: Summary Statistics, 1986 sample
Variable Whole sample SYETP Non SYETP Attrition
Personal characteristics
Male 58.8% 56.7% 59.0% 61.6%
Female 41.2% 43.3% 41.0% 38.4%
Average age, 1984 20.0 19.0 20.1 20.2
Aboriginal/TSI 3.0% 1.0% 3.1% 3.2%
Other ethnic minority 7.9% 7.7% 7.9% 8.3%
Married, 1984 11.7% 2.9% 12.5% 11.0%
Spouse employed 5.9% 1.9% 6.3% 4.0%
Children, 1984 5.5% 1.9% 5.8% 3.4%
Human capital, 1984
Degree/diploma 11.9% 7.7% 12.2% 11.0%
Apprenticeship 8.1% 2.9% 8.6% 7.4%
Other post-school qualification 7.1% 6.7% 7.1% 6.6%
Year 12 14.7% 23.1% 13.9% 13.2%
Year 11 13.9% 17.3% 13.6% 11.9%
Year 10 31.5% 31.7% 31.5% 32.3%
Year 9 or below 12.5% 10.6% 12.6% 17.0%
Parental background
Father post-school qualification @141 33.9% 26.0% 34.6% 31.9%
Mother post-school qualification @141 18.3% 20.2% 18.2% 19.1%
Father manager, professional, para-
professional @141
25.7% 25.0% 25.8% 23.7%
Father not-employed @141 5.5% 3.8% 5.6% 4.1%
Father not present @14 15.7% 19.2% 15.4% 19.1%
Mother manager, professional, para-
professional @141
9.6% 6.7% 9.8% 8.7%
Mother not-employed @141 54.7% 48.1% 55.3% 54.4%
Mother not present @14 5.3% 8.7% 5.0% 6.7%
Longest ever job by 1984
Never held a job 11.6% 11.5% 11.6% 8.7%
<1 year 42.1% 55.8% 40.1% 42.1%
1 year 13.5% 13.5% 13.5% 19.4%
2 years 14.1% 13.5% 14.1% 11.2%
3 years + 18.7% 5.8% 19.8% 18.5%
Average pre-June unemployment2 61.6% 68.5% 61.0% 66.4%
Employment
Ever employed 19863 74.0% 86.5% 72.9% n/a
Ever on govt programme 19864 11.0% 14.4% 10.7% n/a
N 1283 104 1179 645
Notes:
1. Only asked if that parent was present when the respondent was aged 14.
2. Proportion of 1984 reference period up to 3 June spent unemployed.
3. Ever held any non-subsidised, non-government programme job in the 1986 reference period, after the first 17 weeks.
4. Ever go on a government programme, including SYETP, in the 1986 reference period, after the first 17 weeks.
Table 2: Summary Statistics, 1987 sample
Variable Whole sample SYETP Non SYETP Attrition
Personal characteristics
Male 57.8% 54.0% 58.1% 62.2%
Female 42.2% 46.0% 41.9% 37.8%
Average age, 1984 20 19 20.1 20.1
Aboriginal/TSI 2.3% 1.1% 2.4% 4.0%
Other ethnic minority 7.2% 9.2% 7.0% 9.0%
Married, 1984 12.3% 3.4% 13.0% 10.4%
Spouse employed 6.5% 2.3% 6.9% 3.6%
Children, 1984 5.6% 2.3% 5.9% 3.6%
Human capital, 1984
Degree/diploma 12.0% 6.9% 12.4% 11.0%
Apprenticeship 7.9% 3.4% 8.3% 7.7%
Other post-school qualification 7.4% 6.9% 7.4% 6.3%
Year 12 15.0% 24.1% 14.2% 13.0%
Year 11 13.9% 19.5% 13.4% 12.3%
Year 10 31.6% 29.9% 31.8% 31.9%
Year 9 or below 11.5% 9.2% 11.7% 17.1%
Parental background
Father post-school qualification @141 34.3% 27.6% 34.9% 31.8%
Mother post-school qualification @141 18.7% 19.5% 18.7% 18.4%
Father manager, professional, para-
professional @141
26.2% 25.3% 26.3% 23.6%
Father not-employed @141 5.4% 4.6% 5.4% 4.6%
Father not present @14 15.0% 20.7% 14.5% 19.2%
Mother manager, professional, para-
professional @141
9.5% 6.9% 9.7% 9.0%
Mother not-employed @141 54.8% 50.6% 55.2% 54.3%
Mother not present @14 4.7% 6.9% 4.5% 7.2%
Longest ever job by 1984
Never held a job 12.0% 12.6% 11.9% 8.9%
<1 year 42.0% 56.3% 40.7% 42.3%
1 year 12.7% 12.6% 12.7% 19.0%
2 years 14.2% 11.5% 14.4% 11.7%
3 years + 19.1% 6.9% 20.2% 18.1%
Average pre-June unemployment2 62.2% 68.0% 61.7% 64.5%
Employment
Ever employed 19873 77.1% 82.8% 77.9% n/a
Ever employed 1986 74.3% 86.2% 73.2% n/a
N 1084 87 997 852
Notes:
1. Only asked if that parent was present when the respondent was aged 14.
2. Proportion of 1984 reference period up to 3 June spent unemployed.
3. Ever held any non-subsidised, non-government programme job in the 1987 reference period.
Table 3: Univariate probits
Dependent variable: ever employed
in regular, unsubsidised job
Univariate Probit
1986
Univariate Probit
1987
dF/dx1 t dF/dx1 t
SYETP 0.1338*** 3.26 0.0424 0.96
Female –0.1188*** –4.15 –0.0950*** –3.14
Married –0.0301 –0.51 0.0366 0.68
Children –0.0771 –1.00 –0.0476 –0.68
Children x female –0.4549*** –3.84 –0.2963*** –2.94
Spouse employed 0.1329** 2.48 0.0134 0.23
Aboriginal/TS Islander –0.1077 –1.48 –0.1655* –1.85
Other ethnic minority –0.1033* –1.66 –0.0421 –0.67
State initially interviewed in
Victoria –0.0158 –0.44 0.0401 1.14
Queensland –0.0020 –0.05 –0.0723* –1.71
S.Aus/NT –0.1098** –2.33 –0.1152** –2.38
W. Aus/Tas –0.0091 –0.22 0.0578 1.45
Education
School overseas –0.0134 –0.16 –0.1538 –1.46
RC school –0.0186 –0.37 –0.0146 –0.29
Private school 0.1198* 1.79 0.1173* 1.75
Degree/diploma 0.1274*** 3.41 0.1280*** 3.68
Apprenticeship 0.1015** 1.97 0.0816 1.57
Other post–school 0.0157 0.35 0.0550 1.37
Year 12 –0.0003 –0.01 0.1066*** 2.71
Year 11 0.1011*** 2.62 0.0840** 2.17
Year 9 or less –0.0763* –1.79 –0.0778* –1.71
Initial labour market experience
Longest job by 1984: None 0.0054 0.11 –0.0516 –1.01
<1 year 0.0651* 1.79 0.0542 1.42
2 years 0.0721* 1.70 0.0852** 2.04
3 years + 0.1488*** 3.71 0.1269*** 3.12
Other government programme2 –0.2223*** –5.55 –0.1680*** –4.12
Pre–June unemployment % –0.1281*** –3.87 –0.0723** –2.13
Work restricted by health –0.1120*** –3.07 –0.1995*** –4.89
Family background
Other city before 14 –0.0818** –2.15 –0.0352 –0.95
Country town before 14 –0.0209 –0.63 –0.0396 –1.15
Rural area before 14 –0.0690 –1.25 –0.0877 –1.58
Overseas before 14 0.0968 1.09 0.0839 0.82
No. of siblings –0.0091* –1.64 –0.0105 –1.61
English good 0.0951* 1.77 0.0554 0.95
English poor 0.1732** 2.44 0.0704 0.74
Sexist3 –0.1369** –2.19 –0.0198 –0.32
Sexist x female 0.0922 1.02 0.0429 0.44
Dependent variable: ever employed
in regular, unsubsidised job
Univariate Probit
1986
Univariate Probit
1987
dF/dx1 t dF/dx1 t
Father’s occupation @14
Father not present @144 –0.0651 –0.94 –0.0268 –0.41
Labourer 0.0325 0.48 0.0787 1.31
Plant operative 0.0127 0.19 0.0667 1.14
Sales –0.0219 –0.27 0.0224 0.29
Tradesperson –0.0801 –1.18 –0.0146 –0.24
Manager, professional, para–prof. 0.0312 0.50 0.0485 0.84
Not employed 0.0269 0.36 0.0463 0.68
Father post–school qual. @14 0.0269 0.87 0.0327 1.04
Mother’s occupation @14
Mother not present @144 –0.0782 –0.99 0.0014 0.02
Labourer –0.0385 –0.53 0.0005 0.01
Plant operative –0.1622* –1.92 –0.1297 –1.56
Sales –0.1203 –1.68 0.0029 0.04
Tradesperson –0.0603 –0.59 0.0698 0.79
Manager, professional, para–prof. 0.0560 0.91 0.0094 0.15
Not employed –0.0215 –0.41 –0.0173 –0.34
Mother post–school qual. @14 –0.0101 –0.27 –0.0399 –1.02
Religion brought up in
Catholic 0.0955*** 2.85 0.0642* 1.87
Presbyterian 0.1136** 2.35 0.0410 0.79
Methodist 0.0402 0.84 0.0416 0.87
Other Christian –0.0236 –0.38 –0.0073 –0.12
Other Religion –0.0073 –0.16 0.0235 0.50
No religion 0.0871** 2.11 0.0104 0.23
N 1283 1084
Log likelihood –569.76 –451.02
Notes:
* Indicates significance at 10% level, ** at 5% and *** at 1%.
Omitted categories are: European (ethnic origin), New South Wales/Australian Capital Territory (state), government
school, Year 10  (highest education qualification), longest job 1 year, lived mostly in (state) capital city till 14, English
first language, Father clerical worker, Mother clerical worker, Anglican (religion brought up in).
1. Marginal effects are calculated at the sample mean.
2. Went on a government labour market programme, other than SYETP, between 3 June 1984 and their 1985 interview.
3. Respondents were asked 7 questions about women and work. Sexist equals one if they gave reactionary answers to
more than 5 of the 7.
4. Questions about parental occupation and education at age 14 were only asked if that parent was present at 14.
Table 4: Bivariate probit employment equations
Bivariate probit analysis Ever employed 1986 Ever employed 1987
coefficient t coefficient t
SYETP 1.590** 2.45 1.133* 1.93
Female –0.398*** –3.99 –0.359*** –3.20
Married –0.055 –0.28 0.154 0.74
Children –0.238 –0.98 –0.154 –0.62
Children x female –1.212*** –3.79 –0.857*** –2.93
Spouse employed 0.542** 2.40 0.052 0.24
Aboriginal/TS Islander –0.272 –1.17 –0.465 –1.63
Other ethnic minority –0.318* –1.66 –0.179 –0.81
State initially interviewed in
Victoria –0.061 –0.51 0.136 0.97
Queensland 0.027 0.19 –0.222 –1.45
S.Aus/NT –0.306* –1.94 –0.362** –2.18
W. Aus/Tas –0.101 –0.67 0.170 0.96
Education
School overseas –0.095 –0.33 –0.513 –1.56
RC school –0.010 –0.06 –0.001 0.00
Private school 0.603** 2.07 0.681** 1.96
Degree/diploma 0.513*** 3.22 0.585*** 3.43
Apprenticeship 0.431** 2.10 0.365 1.60
Other post–school 0.049 0.32 0.210 1.27
Year 12 –0.063 –0.40 0.403** 1.98
Year 11 0.357** 2.18 0.319* 1.81
Year 9 or less –0.222 –1.59 –0.251 –1.58
Initial labour market experience
Longest job by 1984: None 0.042 0.25 –0.161 –0.88
<1 year 0.190 1.40 0.175 1.15
2 years 0.252 1.56 0.374** 2.05
3 years + 0.657*** 4.00 0.615*** 3.32
Other government programme1 –0.624*** –4.74 –0.537*** –4.12
Pre–June unemployment % –0.473*** –4.19 –0.309** –2.39
Work restricted by health –0.306** –2.43 –0.580*** –4.07
Family background
Other city before 14 –0.218 –1.61 –0.118 –0.87
Country town before 14 –0.001 –0.01 –0.098 –0.74
Rural area before 14 –0.128 –0.65 –0.229 –1.14
Overseas before 14 0.494 1.36 0.446 0.96
No. of siblings –0.028 –1.49 –0.038 –1.51
English good 0.403* 1.91 0.234 0.96
English poor 1.050*** 2.75 0.442 1.05
Sexist2 –0.440** –2.35 –0.108 –0.47
Sexist x female 0.463 1.25 0.187 0.47
Bivariate probit analysis Ever employed 1986 Ever employed 1987
coefficient t coefficient t
Father’s occupation @14
Father not present @143 –0.180 –0.79 –0.070 –0.29
Labourer 0.134 0.55 0.392 1.49
Plant operative 0.058 0.25 0.325 1.33
Sales –0.049 –0.18 0.145 0.48
Tradesperson –0.214 –0.95 0.009 0.04
Manager, professional, para–prof. 0.114 0.52 0.220 0.96
Not employed 0.146 0.55 0.249 0.88
Father post–school qual. @14 0.141 1.26 0.158 1.29
Mother’s occupation @14
Mother not present @143 –0.335 –1.33 –0.066 –0.22
Labourer –0.151 –0.64 –0.005 –0.02
Plant operative –0.576** –2.30 –0.531* –1.94
Sales –0.392* –1.80 –0.022 –0.09
Tradesperson –0.229 –0.70 0.220 0.56
Manager, professional, para–prof. 0.217 0.97 0.031 0.13
Not employed –0.087 –0.49 –0.091 –0.46
Mother post–school qual. @14 –0.067 –0.52 –0.161 –1.14
Religion brought up in
Catholic 0.327** 2.52 0.249* 1.79
Presbyterian 0.413* 1.88 0.116 0.54
Methodist 0.133 0.77 0.164 0.84
Other Christian –0.102 –0.50 –0.018 –0.08
Other Religion –0.045 –0.28 0.077 0.42
No religion 0.280 1.58 –0.018 –0.10
r –0.622** 2.17 –0.553** 2.24
N 1283 1084
Log likelihood –875.96 –711.58
Notes:
* Indicates significance at 10% level, ** at 5% and *** at 1%.
Omitted categories are: European (ethnic origin), New South Wales/Australian Capital Territory (state), government
school, Year 10  (highest education qualification), longest job 1 year, lived mostly in (state) capital city till 14, English
first language, Father clerical worker, Mother clerical worker, Anglican (religion brought up in).
1. Went on a government labour market programme, other than SYETP, between 3 June 1984 and their 1985 interview.
2. Respondents were asked 7 questions about women and work. Sexist equals one if they gave reactionary answers to
more than 5 of the 7.
3. Questions about parental occupation and education at age 14 were only asked if that parent was present at 14.
Table 5: Selection equations
Bivariate probit analysis SYETP participation, 1986 SYETP participation, 1987
coefficient t coefficient t
Female 0.088 0.71 0.074 0.56
Age, 1984 –0.107*** –3.16 –0.100*** –2.73
Married, 1984 –0.855 –1.52 –0.779 –1.36
Children, 1984 0.465 0.78 0.439 0.71
Children x female –0.296 –0.37 –0.168 –0.20
Spouse employed, 1984 0.498 0.81 0.365 0.57
Aboriginal/TS Islander –0.451 –1.01 –0.238 –0.49
Other ethnic minority 0.081 0.33 0.121 0.46
State initially interviewed in
Victoria 0.112 0.72 0.137 0.80
Queensland –0.279 –1.30 –0.135 –0.62
S.Aus/NT –0.157 –0.77 –0.071 –0.33
W. Aus/Tas 0.317* 1.78 0.337* 1.70
Education
School overseas 0.078 0.22 0.251 0.64
RC school –0.310 –1.30 –0.296 –1.11
Private school –0.636 –1.38 –0.746 –1.42
Degree/diploma, 1984 0.120 0.51 0.014 0.05
Apprenticeship, 1984 –0.129 –0.42 0.027 0.08
Other post-school, 1984 –0.036 –0.14 0.110 0.42
Year 12, 1984 0.433** 2.46 0.441** 2.30
Year 11, 1984 0.101 0.53 0.285 1.49
Year 9 or less, 1984 –0.074 –0.35 –0.020 –0.09
Initial labour market experience
Longest job by 1984: None –0.348 –1.34 –0.377 –1.40
<1 year –0.020 –0.11 0.000 0.00
2 years 0.173 0.80 0.035 0.14
3 years + –0.326 –1.26 –0.344 –1.18
CEP referrals, 1984 0.144** 1.97 0.164** 2.27
Pre-June unemployment % 0.487*** 2.92 0.387** 2.19
Work restricted by health, 1984 –0.633** –2.53 –0.561** –2.23
Family background
Other city before 14 –0.244 –1.48 –0.140 –0.79
Country town before 14 –0.473*** –2.94 –0.379** –2.23
Rural area before 14 –0.446* –1.69 –0.340 –1.24
Overseas before 14 –0.757 –1.48 –0.556 –1.06
No. of siblings –0.011 –0.70 –0.003 –0.08
English good –0.185 –0.72 –0.001 0.00
English poor –0.591 –1.13 –0.468 –0.89
Sexist 0.317 1.22 0.238 0.96
Sexist x female –0.903 –1.38 –1 –1
Bivariate probit analysis SYETP participation, 1986 SYETP participation, 1987
coefficient t coefficient t
Father’s occupation @14
Father not present @14 –0.309 –1.11 –0.191 –0.66
Labourer –0.263 –0.84 –0.332 –1.02
Plant operative –0.267 –0.96 –0.343 –1.14
Sales –0.086 –0.26 –0.277 –0.73
Tradesperson –0.300 –1.10 –0.338 –1.17
Manager, professional, para-prof. –0.153 –0.59 –0.201 –0.73
Not employed –0.457 –1.29 –0.435 –1.15
Father post-school qual. @14 –0.315** –2.14 –0.234 –1.45
Mother’s occupation @14
Mother not present @14 0.480 1.49 0.370 1.03
Labourer 0.176 0.57 0.041 0.12
Plant operative 0.697** 2.26 0.677** 2.05
Sales 0.190 0.66 0.085 0.26
Tradesperson 0.119 0.28 0.188 0.42
Manager, professional, para-prof. –0.247 –0.85 –0.198 –0.60
Not employed 0.041 0.17 0.084 0.32
Mother post-school qual. @14 0.266* 1.66 0.178 0.99
Religion brought up in
Catholic 0.061 0.38 0.006 0.03
Presbyterian 0.322 1.34 0.390 1.53
Methodist 0.017 0.06 0.018 0.06
Other Christian 0.075 0.27 0.001 0.01
Other Religion 0.176 0.80 0.151 0.63
No religion 0.138 0.66 0.205 0.95
N 1283 1084
Notes:
* Indicates significance at 10% level, ** at 5% and *** at 1%.
Omitted categories are: European (ethnic origin), New South Wales/Australian Capital Territory (state), government
school, Year 10  (highest education qualification), longest job 1 year, lived mostly in (state) capital city till 14, English
first language, Father clerical worker, Mother clerical worker, Anglican (religion brought up in).
1. Dropped due to perfect collinearity with SYETP.
Table 6: Marginal Effects
Marginal effect of SYETP on
probability of employment1
1986 1987
Whole sample average 0.264 0.197
Female 0.317 0.245
Married 0.246 0.192
Married, spouse employed 0.186 0.178
S. Aus/NT 0.324 0.255
Degree/diploma 0.162 0.135
Apprenticeship 0.105 0.081
Year 12 0.263 0.147
Year 10 0.316 0.256
Private school 0.127 0.098
No previous job 0.371 0.306
Longest job 1 year 0.327 0.241
Longest job 3 years+ 0.133 0.101
Work restricted by health 0.358 0.307
Father not employed @14 0.317 0.258
Father plant operative @14 0.262 0.181
Father manager, professional, para-
professional @14
0.185 0.148
Father post-school qualification @14 0.213 0.161
Age 22+ in 1984 0.204 0.152
Age <21 in 1984 0.299 0.225
Age <19 in 1984 0.308 0.236
Marginal effect of selected other
significant characteristics
1986 1987
Female –0.108 –0.095
Child x female –0.353 –0.237
S. Aus/N.T. –0.082 –0.094
Private school 0.129 0.129
Degree/diploma 0.123 0.130
Apprenticeship 0.104 0.084
Longest job 3 years+ 0.157 0.142
Work restricted by health –0.079 –0.154
Notes:
1.  
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where  F is the standard (univariate) normal cumulative distribution function, and q takes the value 1 if the person is
selected onto the programme, and –1 otherwise.
Table 7: Subsequent, never-subsidised, jobs
1987Dependent variable: Ever employed
in a never subsidised, non-
programme job
coefficient t
SYETP 1.049** 2.19
Female –0.343*** –2.79
Married 0.185 0.87
Children –0.119 –0.44
Children x female –0.695** –2.23
Spouse employed –0.119 –0.53
Aboriginal/TS Islander –0.574* –1.84
Other ethnic minority –0.207 –0.86
State initially interviewed in
Victoria 0.097 0.61
Queensland –0.149 –0.89
S.Aus/NT –0.388** –2.17
W. Aus/Tas 0.122 0.65
Education
School overseas –0.681* –1.77
RC school –0.052 –0.25
Private school 0.693* 1.90
Degree/diploma 0.603*** 3.29
Apprenticeship 0.347 1.37
Other post-school 0.298* 1.67
Year 12 0.354* 1.72
Year 11 0.392** 2.11
Year 9 or less –0.229 –1.32
Initial labour market experience
Longest job by 1984: None –0.213 –1.01
<1 year 0.211 1.26
2 years 0.391* 1.95
3 years + 0.559*** 2.74
Other government programme1 –0.451*** –3.19
Pre-June unemployment % –0.314** –2.20
Work restricted by health –0.497*** –3.56
Family background
Other city before 14 –0.015 –0.10
Country town before 14 –0.105 –0.73
Rural area before 14 –0.148 –0.65
Overseas before 14 0.336 0.63
No. of siblings –0.049* –1.78
English good 0.181 0.64
English poor 0.462 0.98
Sexist2 –0.127 –0.51
Sexist x female –0.006 –0.01
1987Dependent variable: Ever employed
in a never subsidised, non-
programme job
coefficient t
Father’s occupation @14
Father not present @143 0.004 0.02
Labourer 0.428 1.42
Plant operative 0.358 1.28
Sales 0.290 0.86
Tradesperson 0.105 0.39
Manager, professional, para-prof. 0.234 0.90
Not employed 0.382 1.22
Father post-school qual. @14 0.071 0.52
Mother’s occupation @14
Mother not present @143 0.018 0.06
Labourer 0.036 0.12
Plant operative –0.457 –1.55
Sales –0.008 –0.03
Tradesperson 0.032 0.07
Manager, professional, para-prof. 0.031 0.12
Not employed –0.070 –0.33
Mother post-school qual. @14 –0.087 –0.56
Religion brought up in
Catholic 0.240 1.58
Presbyterian 0.193 0.81
Methodist 0.104 0.49
Other Christian –0.220 –0.79
Other Religion 0.140 0.71
No religion 0.002 0.01
r –0.631*** 3.77
N 781
Log likelihood –552.23
Notes:
* Indicates significance at 10% level, ** at 5% and *** at 1%.
Omitted categories are: European (ethnic origin), New South Wales/Australian Capital Territory (state), government
school, Year 10  (highest education qualification), longest job 1 year, lived mostly in (state) capital city till 14, English
first language, Father clerical worker, Mother clerical worker, Anglican (religion brought up in).
1. Went on a government labour market programme, other than SYETP, between 3 June 1984 and their 1985 interview.
2. Respondents were asked 7 questions about women and work. Sexist equals one if they gave reactionary answers to
more than 5 of the 7.
3. Questions about parental occupation and education at age 14 were only asked if that parent was present at 14.
Figure 1: Start weeks of SYETP spells, treatment group
Figure 2: Length of regular jobs
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Figure 3: Length of SYETP jobs
Figure 4: Length of post-unemployment jobs
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 Figure 5: Length of pre-SYETP unemployment spells
Figure 6: Length of post-SYETP unemployment spells
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Figure 7: Length of pre-SYETP employment spells
Figure 8: Length of post-SYETP employment spells
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